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CASE NOTES
Bankruptcy—Failure of Federal Tax Lien.—City of New York v. United
States. 1—An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against a falter-
ing Company by creditors claiming unpaid wages. Prior to and within
four (4) months of the petition in Bankruptcy an assignment for the benefit
of creditors had been made and perfected by the debtor in accordance with
the State's statutory provisions. Subsequently, and again prior to the date
of the petition in bankruptcy, the Federal Government assessed tax defi-
ciencies against the debtor and claimed lien status for these assessments under
§ 67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. 2 These claims were opposed by the other
creditors including the City of New York and the State of New York,
who also were tax creditors of the debtor. The referee in bankruptcy
and the District Court° upheld the Federal Government's lien status but the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. HELD: The Federal Government
was not entitled to lien status on assessments made after such general assign-
ment even though the assignment was made within four (4) months of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition in view of the fact that a Federal tax lien
attaches to property belonging to a debtor, and under New York law the
debtor did not have any property after his general assignment.
The Court rejected the appellee's contention that State property law
was preempted by § 70(a)(8) 4 of the Bankruptcy Act which recites that
the title to property held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors shall vest
in the trustee in bankruptcy by operation of law at the time of the filing
of the petition, the assignee being deemed the agent of the debtor, since this
section would not be construed to apply retroactively from the date of
the petition. In so holding the Court looked to the applicable state law to
determine what property rights remained in the debtor after his assignment
for the benefit of creditors to determine the effect of the Federal Govern-
ment's tax lien which by the statute° attaches to the taxpayer's property at
the moment of assessment. The Court reiterated a point previously empha-
sized that the tax lien statute ° "created no property rights but merely attaches
consequences, federally defined, to rights under State law". 7 Under applicable
New York Law8 an assignee for the benefit of creditors was deemed to have
taken the debtor's title and to have held it in trust for all the creditors, so
that after the assignment and prior to the Federal Government's perfection
of its tax lien, the debtor had relinquished that to which the lien could attach.
Accordingly Paragraph 67 sub b. of the Bankruptcy Acts, which would up-
1 283 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1960).
2 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(6) (1958).
3 180 F. Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
4 11 U.S.C, § 110(a)(8) (1958).
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6321, 6322.
6 Supra note 5.
7 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1957).
8 Brown v. Guthrie, 110 N.Y. 435, 18 N.E. 254 (1888); Brennan v. Wilson, 71
N.Y. 502 (1877).
' Supra note 2.
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hold statutory liens for taxes and debts to the Government even though
arising and perfected while the debtor was insolvent and within the four (4)
months period prior to the filing of the petition, would not assist the Federal
Government's position because of the failure of debtor property to which
the lien could attach.
It is interesting to ponder the significance of this case in view of recent
determinations in this area. It has been well settled by the Supreme Court
that the determination of priority of liens was entirely a Federal question
and that regardless of the State's characterization of their liens, the deter-
minations would be subjected to the "choateness" test of the Supreme Court.'°
This approach protected the Federal Government's lien from those prema-
turely perfected, by the State. This "federal question" of determining the
priority of liens was dependent upon the basic assumption that the debtor had
property to which a lien could attach and the question of what "property or
property rights" existed was entirely considered a State determination. In
United States v. Bess" the Court upheld the Federal Government's lien on the
proceeds of an insurance policy to the extent of its cash surrender value, as
against the beneficiary, since State law defined that the insured had such
property rights in the policy during his lifetime when his taxes were assessed,
even though the State taw prescribed immuntiy from such levying as against
the beneficiary. In United States v. Durham Lumber Company' 2
 the Court re-
mained consistent to its holding in Bess and prevented the Federal Government
from prevailing over a creditor sub-contractor of the taxpayer general con-
tractor. Under State law the creditor sub-contractor could reach directly
the funds owed to the general contractor by the owner of the constructed
property and such was determined to have stripped the general contractor
of his property rights prior to the assessment and attachment of the Federal
lien, thus removing the property to which the lien could attach. The nature
of the shift in the property interests is defined in Durham and its companion
case Aquilino v. United States' 3
 as one of "constructive trust" wherein the
debtor general contractor holds for the benefit of the creditor sub-contractors.
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Aquilino and Durham cases" expresses con-
cermover the classification of the position of a creditor as that of a property
holder in those situations where the incidents of ownership remaining in the
/debtor or being transferred to a creditor can not be distinguished from the
secured position of a lienor, and also over the possibility that unless some
10 United States v. Hu lley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958); United States v. Ball Construction
Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957); United
States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956); United States v. Colotta, 350
U.S. 808 (1955); United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. Liver-
pool and London Globe Ins, Co., Ltd., 348 U.S. 215 (1955); United States v. Acri, 348
U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United
States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 81 (1950).
11 Supra note 7.
12 363 U.S. 522 (1959).
13 363 U.S. 509 (1959).
14 363 U.S. at 516.
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Federal standard is applied there would be nothing to prevent the States from
frustrating Federal tax liens by statutorily labeling what now is characterized
a lien as a property transfer from debtor to creditor.
The Durham classification could equally have satisfied the definition of
a lien in the nature of a "mechanic's lien" which by virtue of § 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act" would be valid even though made while the debtor was
insolvent and within four (4) months of the petition of Bankruptcy, but
would have been subjected to the Federal standard of "choateness" in order
to qualify as a prior lien with respect to the Federal tax lien. However, since
such transmutation was characterized by the State, or by the Federal Court's
interpretation of the State law, as a property transfer, the Court never reaches
the Federal question of the priority of liens. The Court in the Durham case
accepted the State law determination as not unreasonable but failed to discuss
the merits of the characterization. It cannot he determined from the cases
what standard of reasonableness, if any, the Court is applying when viewing
State property classifications but it would not be too conjectural to anticipate
an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act defining exactly what property classifi-
cation will be reasonable, based probably on a standard of "ownership inci-
dents," if State law should develop so as to frustrate the Federal tax lien.
However, even if such an eventuality were to transpire, an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, as in the instant case, should most readily satisfy any
reasonable standard.
Ch ARLES D. FERRIS
Banks—Forged Checks—Recovery by the Drawee Bank.— Mechanics
National Bank of Worcester v. Worcester County Trust Company.1—
On September 9, 1952, an unknown man presented a $3940 check to a teller
at the defendant Worcester County Trust Company (hereinafter referred
to as the Trust Co.). The check, dated September 5, 1952, was drawn on
the plaintiff National Bank of Worcester (hereafter referred to as National),
payable to "cash" and signed "Anthony A. Borgatti." It was indorsed
"Ralph Scala." The stranger also presented a deposit slip in the amount of
$340 in the name of Ralph Scola, which was the name of one of the Trust
Co.'s depositors. The indorsement and the deposit slip signatures were not
in the same handwriting and the "S" in "Scala" had been scratched over.
The Trust Co.'s teller took the check and deposit slip from the stranger
without requiring identification and without comparing the signatures with
the signature of Scola in the files. National's bookkeeper informed the Trust
Co.'s teller by telephone that National had no account in the name of the
drawer but had one in the name of "Brigida Borgatti, Conservator for
Antonio Borgatti." The teller then credited Scola's account with the $340
15 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
1 170 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1960).
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